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KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECTION TO RELIGIOUS
BELIEF FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE

KELLY JAMES CLARK & DANI RABINOWITZ
Calvin College

Oxford University

Abstract. A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief
is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized,
such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather
different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent
cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic
concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then
present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an
argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works.1

Belief in gods requires no special parts of the brain. Belief in gods requires
no special mystical experiences, though it may be aided by such experiences.
Belief in gods requires no coercion or brainwashing or special persuasive
techniques. Rather, belief in gods arises because of the natural functioning
of completely normal mental tools working in common natural and social
contexts.

Barrett (2004: 21)

I.
Theism is no stranger to attack. In its long and checkered history
it has faced a barrage of tough assaults on its veracity. Some of these
challenges, like the problem of evil, remain unresolved. The scientific
revolution marked the beginning of a particularly difficult period for
theism, with these difficulties intensified by modern science. Today
1

Thanks to John Hawthorne, Michael Murray, Justin Barrett, and Alvin Plantinga
for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3 (2011), PP. 67–81

K EL LY JA M ES C L A R K & DAN I RAB I NOW I T Z

68

the science vs. theism debate is an industry of its own. In recent years
a growing number of atheists have made recourse to some of the findings
in contemporary cognitive science to formulate a novel challenge to
theistic belief. According to several psychologists, anthropologists,
evolutionary theorists, and cognitive scientists, the human mind evolved
in such a way that it is naturally drawn towards belief in disembodied,
supernatural agents, the God of monotheism being just one such agent.
The belief that God exists, according to most defenders of this view, is an
accidental byproduct of certain cognitive mechanisms that evolved for
rather different adaptive purposes. Richard Dawkins (2006: 200-22) and
Daniel Dennett (2006), for example, make use of this research in their
case against theism.2 Whilst neither explicitly claims that in virtue of
this research there is something epistemically suspect about the belief
that God exists, the innuendo is obvious. Dawkins contends that these
findings partly explain why it is that people acquire and maintain the
delusion that God exists, whilst for Dennett this research breaks the spell
that binds us to religious belief.
Since no formal arguments are presented, it remains unclear how
the research in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be used to
undermine the epistemic status of the belief that God exists (hereafter
the CSR objection). Some, e.g., Murray (2009) and Clark and Barrett
(2010, forthcoming) have taken up the challenge of proposing different
ways in which such arguments could be formulated to the conclusion
that religious beliefs are irrational. This paper is a continuation of this
line of work but differs in two respects. Firstly, we consider how the
CSR objection might be understood in terms of Timothy Williamson’s
knowledge-first framework. Secondly, in light of the significant role that
testimony plays in the acquisition and transmission of religious belief,
we consider the role the epistemology of testimony could play in the
CSR objection. §2 begins with a presentation of the relevant aspects of
the CSR research. Thereafter follows a brief explanation of Williamson’s
claim that safe belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. A treatment
of several epistemic terms of art concludes §2. In §3 we present two
different ways in which the CSR research can be formulated into an
2

See also Atran (2002), Bering (2006, 2011), Bloom (2005), Boyer (2001), and
Wilson (2002).
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argument to the effect that the belief that God exists is unsafe. We argue
that neither version works.

II.
2.1. The Cognitive Science of Religion
Owing to differences in methodologies and research goals, there is
unfortunately no definitive statement of the cognitive and evolutionary
psychology of religion. For our purposes it will suffice to draw attention
to the work of Justin Barrett (2004, 2009), a dominant figure in the CSR
literature. Here is a rough sketch of Barrett’s theory.
Human beings are naturally prone to develop a certain class of concepts
that Barrett labels “minimally counterintuitive concepts” (MCIs). A MCI
is a standard concept that has been augmented in some rather unusual
ways such that it becomes attention-grabbing; easy to understand and
remember; and has the capacity to feature in the explanation of many
events. A “talking shoe” or an “invisible dog” are examples of MCIs. It is
not unusual to find disparate groups, despite having no contact with one
another, having many MCIs in common. The concept of a “god” is an
example of a common MCI, where a “god” is a disembodied, supernatural
agent. Eventually the concept “God” developed where that term denotes
the God of monotheism.
The mental configuration of human beings also includes an Agency
Detecting Device (ADD) that disposes us to detect agency in our
environment. Since ADD is sometimes triggered on the slenderest of
bases, this so-called hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD)
often registers false positives. With respect to evolutionary psychology,
possessing such a hypersensitive device has survival advantages since
the speedy and non-inferential detection of an agent in the vicinity
(a predator, say, or a potential mate) would have led to greater reproductive
success. Once the presence of an agent is registered a second mental
tool kicks in. This tool, commonly termed “Theory of Mind” (ToM),
attributes a mental life to the detected agent, where such attributions
typically concern what desires or intentions that agent might have vis-àvis the subject.
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At a point in our history some primitive peoples perceived a state of
affairs that resulted in HADD triggering a belief in the presence of an
agent. With the aid of ToM, the state of affairs made sense in virtue of
an agent acting in such-and-such a way with such-and-such intentions.
However, only agents with MCI concepts of god-like agents could explain
what they had perceived, as no natural explanation adequately accounted
for these circumstances. As a result human beings came to believe that
God exists. In some cases the order of explanation is in the reverse—the
MCI “God” developed on its own apart from such inexplicable states
of affairs. Only much later did certain human beings retroactively
understand said states of affairs in terms of God’s actions.

2.2. Knowledge as Safe Belief
Knowledge, for Williamson (2000), requires avoidance of error in similar
enough cases. The basic idea is that S knows P only if S is safe from error,
where being safe means that there must be no risk or danger that S falsely
believes in a relevantly similar case. Knowledge, then, requires a margin
for error; that is, cases in which S knows P must be buffered by cases of
true belief. The relevant modal notions of safety, risk, and danger are
cashed out in terms of possible worlds such that a margin for error is
created in so far as there is no close world in which S falls into error. Such
worlds act as a “buffer zone” from error and thereby prevent the type of
epistemic luck that characterizes Gettier cases.3 Here is one pertinent
formulation of the safety condition:
If in a case α one knows p on a basis B, then in any case close to α in which
one believes a proposition p* close to p on a basis [B*] close to B, then p* is
true (Williamson 2009: 325).

For example, S does not know that it’s noon by looking at a broken clock
correctly reading noon since there is a close world in which S believes
falsely e.g. a world in which S looks at the broken clock slightly before or
after noon or where the broken clock incorrectly reads 12:02.
3

See Gettier (1963) and Shope (1983).
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Unlike the aforementioned authors, we grapple with the CSR
objection in terms of knowledge and not in terms of rationality. There are
several reasons for this difference in strategy. Firstly, since those putting
forward the CSR objection do not explicitly state that religious beliefs
are irrational in virtue of findings in cognitive science and evolutionary
psychology, prima facie there is no reason to interpret their challenge
in terms of rationality instead of knowledge, especially if knowledge is
the more primitive concept of the two.4 Given the current popularity
of explications of knowledge in terms of safe belief, Williamson’s safety
condition is a natural choice seeing that he is one of the more influential
safety theorists.5
Secondly, most agree that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief.
However, there is no such consensus to be found amongst those working
on rationality. Whilst some consider rationality to be the degree to which
evidence increases the probability of a belief ’s being true, others see it as
a property that supervenes on the reliability of cognitive mechanisms.
And yet others deem it to be a kind of self-reflective state. As such some
see rationality as being determined from an external point of view whilst
others from an internal point of view. And the concepts of rationality
that result from such divergent approaches can be radically different.
By concentrating on knowledge as opposed to rationality we avoid this
murky and contested territory.
Thirdly, given that the CSR research concerns the accidental nature
by which theistic belief arose, one natural concern would be that theistic
belief is accidentally true or unsafe. It would not make sense, then, to
formulate arguments against theistic belief on the basis of the CSR research
in terms of rationality for on most accounts of rationality an agent S may
be rational in believing p despite S’s being lucky that p is true.
Finally, there is good reason to think that the appropriate norm
for assertion and practical reasoning is knowledge and not justified or
rational belief (Williamson 2000: 238ff; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008).
Since theistic belief is often the subject of assertion and, more importantly,
influences the way theists go about living their lives, it makes sense to
worry about whether theists can know that God exists in light of the
4
For arguments to the effect that knowledge is a primitive concept, see Williamson
(2000: 2-5).
5
Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2005, 2009) are the other two influential safety theorists.
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CSR research more than whether theists can rationally believe that God
exists.
Before commencing our treatment of the CSR objection, two
epistemic terms of art need to be addressed. Firstly, there is a distinction
between individual epistemology and social epistemology. The first
makes normative assessments of a specific agent’s beliefs, e.g., that an
agent S’s belief that p is warranted or rational or justified or known if
and only if conditions C1, …, Cn are satisfied. The second differs in that
normative assessments are made about an entire community’s belief(s).
We understand the methodology of social epistemology to begin with
an assessment of which method or cognitive process a group uses to
produce a certain belief and then to judge the epistemic status of that
belief, the judgment naturally applying to all agents in that community.
An adequate treatment of the CSR objection must take into account this
distinction for it is unclear whether CSR objectors have specific theists in
mind or intend their remarks to apply to all theists.
Secondly, knowledge is factive—only true propositions can be known.
Without thereby begging the question, it makes little sense for the CSR
objection to be framed on the assumption that theism is false for then
it would be trivially true that theistic belief is unsafe. The CSR literature
would then be irrelevant to the claim that theistic belief is unsafe. We
therefore interpret the CSR objector as making the very interesting claim
that despite it being true that God exists, God cannot be known to exist.6
Given the conceptual dependence of assertion, practical reasoning, and
evidence on knowledge in Williamson’s framework (ibid.: 184ff ), such
a challenge is a serious one indeed.

III.
As adverted to earlier, we think that the CSR objection can be formulated
into two different arguments to the conclusion that the belief that God
exists is unsafe. An independent discussion of each objection follows.
6
The same point can be made with respect to interpreting the CSR objector as
claiming that theistic belief is unjustified, where justification is understood as a property
supervening on the reliability of a cognitive process.
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3.1. The Counterfactual Argument
Recall that one does not know it is noon by looking at a broken clock
that fortuitously just so happens to correctly read noon. That the agent
would have falsely believed it noon even if it were not noon is one way
of explaining why agents who look at broken clocks fortuitously reading
the correct time are denied knowledge. On similar grounds, the CSR
objector might have the following argument in mind:
(1) If God did not exist human beings would still believe that God
exists (given that humans are primed to believe in supernatural
agents independent of whether or not such agents exist).
(2) Therefore the belief that God exists is unsafe.
The cogency of this argument turns on the first premise, which is
expressed in the form of a counterfactual. There are three reasons
why this argument fails. Firstly, those familiar with the history of
knowledge accounts in the post-Gettier period will recognize that the
type of counterfactual expressed by (1) corresponds to Robert Nozick’s
sensitivity condition for knowledge. According to Nozick (1981: 171),
an agent S does not know p if it is the case that were p false S would still
believe p. It is now widely recognized that the sensitivity condition for
knowledge is inadequate in several respects.7 That theistic belief fails to
satisfy the sensitivity condition for knowledge in light of evolutionary
cognitive science is therefore irrelevant.
Secondly, the Counterfactual Argument is invalid as it is not the case
that if a belief fails the sensitivity condition it is therefore unsafe; that is
to say, a failure of sensitivity does not entail a lack of safety. For example,
in some cases sensitivity is the more stringent condition, whilst in others
safety is. The following two points of logic elicit the difference between
the safety and sensitivity conditions. When it comes to cases concerning
knowledge of the denial of skeptical hypotheses the safety principle is
less demanding than the sensitivity principle. The sensitivity principle
requires that the agent not believe p in the nearest possible world in which
7

For some reasons counting against the sensitivity condition, see Goldman (1986:
45-6).
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p is false. As such no agent can know the denial of skeptical hypotheses,
e.g., “I am not a brain in the vat,” by the simple sensitivity test because
in the nearest possible world in which the agent is a brain in the vat the
agent continues to believe that he is not a brain in the vat.
The safety principle, however, permits knowing the denial of skeptical
hypotheses. By the safety principle I count as knowing the everyday
proposition p “that I have hands” only if I safely believe p. It follows, then,
that if I safely believe p then there is no close world in which I am a brain
in the vat and am led to falsely believe that I have hands. Consequently,
if I know that I have hands and I know that that entails that I am not
a brain in the vat, then I know that I am not a brain in the vat.
On the other hand, cases can be constructed in which safety is more
demanding than sensitivity. Suppose S truly believes p in the actual
world but (i) in the closest world in which p is false S does not believe p,
and (ii) there is a close world in which S falsely believes p. In this case S
satisfies the sensitivity condition but fails to satisfy the safety condition.
The following case illustrates this point. Unbeknownst to Mary the
thermometer she has just purchased is defective and will always yield
a reading of 39°C regardless of her temperature. Mary, who is running
a fever of 39°C, then uses the thermometer to measure her temperature
and it just so happens to correctly read her temperature of 39°C. However,
in the nearest world in which her temperature is not 39°C and she uses
this thermometer to take her temperature, she is distracted by her son
and she doesn’t form any belief about her temperature. She accordingly
satisfies the sensitivity condition for knowledge. However, there happens
to be a non-closest close world in which Mary, who is running a fever of
38.5°C, uses this thermometer to take her temperature and consequently
forms the false belief that her temperature is 39°C. Mary thus fails to
satisfy the safety condition.
In light of the complicated relationship between the sensitivity and
safety conditions for knowledge, with respect to any belief p it is not the
case that failure of the sensitivity condition entails failure of the safety
condition. The counterfactual argument is therefore invalid.
A third reason to discount the Counterfactual Argument is a semantic
one. According to the standard Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals,
a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent is vacuously true (Lewis
1973: 24). For example, the counterfactual (3) “If frogs were numbers,
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pigs would fly” is true but vacuously so. As discussed earlier, we have
interpreted the CSR objector as putting forward her objection on the
assumption that God exists. On standard conceptions of God’s existence,
if God exists he exists necessarily. That is to say, he exists in every possible
world. Therefore by the CSR objector’s own lights the antecedent of
(1) is impossible. Asserting (1), therefore, amounts to no more than
asserting (3). There is thus ample reason to discredit the Counterfactual
Argument.

3.2. The Argument from Testimony Chains
Reliability, as a property of a belief-forming method, comes in different
kinds, two of which are important for the purpose at hand—local and
global. The latter refers to a method M’s reliability in producing a range
of token output beliefs in different propositions P, Q, R, …, etc. A method
M is globally reliable if and only if it produces sufficiently more true
beliefs than false beliefs in a range of different propositions. For example,
M could be the visual process and P the proposition that there is a pencil
on the desk, Q the proposition that there are clouds in the sky, and R
the proposition that the bin is full. If a sufficiently high number of P,
Q, R, … are true, then method M is globally reliable. A method M is
locally reliable with respect to an individual target belief P if and only if
M produces a sufficient ratio of more true beliefs than false beliefs in that
very proposition P. Method M, e.g. the visual method, is locally reliable
with respect to the belief P if and only it produces a sufficiently high ratio
of true beliefs about the presence of the pencil on the desk.8
According to Williamson, for a belief to count as safe it must, amongst
other things, be the product of a globally reliable method or basis: “If
in a case α one knows P on a basis B, then in any case close to α in
which one believes a proposition P* close to P on a basis close to B, P* is
true” (Williamson 2009: 325). In light of these considerations, the CSR
objector might have the following argument in mind:
8
At this point we remain neutral on whether reliability should be understood
as actual reliability à la McGinn (1999) or as counterfactual reliability à la Goldman
(2000).
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(3) The basis on which the theist believes that God exists is globally
unreliable.
(4) Therefore, the belief that God exists is unsafe.
According to Barrett, the basis on which theistic belief arose involves the
interaction of HADD, MCI’s, and other mental tools, ToM in particular.
For the sake of ease, let us call this set of mental tools HADD+. On the
simplifying assumption that these constitute a singular basis of belief,
HADD+, so the CSR objection argues, is globally unreliable as HADD+
generates many false positives. Hence, the doxastic products of HADD+
are unsafe. The above argument is therefore valid and theistic belief
unsafe.
As discussed earlier, the distinction between individual and social
epistemology must be kept in mind when assessing the CSR objection. It
is unclear which theist is the target of this argument. With respect to the
contemporary theist, it is controversial whether (i) said theists come to
believe that God exists on the basis of HADD+, and (ii) whether HADD+
is globally unreliable. Concerning (i), some contemporary theists believe
that God exists either via testimony or as the result of an argument,
neither of which involves HADD+. With respect to (ii), even were the
contemporary theist to believe that God exists on the basis of HADD+,
today we use HADD+ in a fashion that is globally reliable; that is, we
form more true than false beliefs about agents in our environments. So
the above argument is irrelevant to most contemporary theists.
Suppose, however, we concede the truth of (3) for the very earliest
theists because they were using HADD+ in ways that generated many
false positives; that is to say, for these very early theists their HADD+
may have been globally unreliable. Therefore, with respect to these very
early theists the belief that God exists was unsafe. Given this supposition,
the CSR objector might have the following argument in mind:
(5) On the basis of HADD+ some primordial human beings came
to believe that God exists.
(6) In these primordial human beings HADD+ was a globally
unreliable basis for belief.
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(7) Beliefs produced by globally unreliable methods do not
constitute knowledge.
(8) Therefore, these primordial human beings did not know that
God exists.
(9) Contemporary theists believe that God exists via testimony
chains originating with these primordial human beings.
(10) A testimony chain that does not begin with knowledge cannot
yield knowledge to the recipient at the termination of that
testimony chain.
(11) Therefore, contemporary theists don’t know that God exists via
such testimony chains.
The Argument from Testimony Chains seeks to undermine the epistemic
status of theistic belief by identifying its epistemically suspect causal origins.
It goes without saying that the causal origin of a belief p can be important
to the epistemic status of p. For instance, I cannot know q if I believe q on
the basis of an inference from p, and where I do not know p.9
As has been conceded, (5)—(8) may indeed be true. And given that
many contemporary theists believe that God exists via testimony, (9)
may be true as well. (10), however, is false. An agent S2 can safely believe
a true proposition p via testimony from an agent S1 even if S1 does not
safely believe p. Consider the following case from Lackey (2008: 48). It
is plausible that a child knows that modern-day homo sapiens evolved
from homo erectus when taught so by her teacher, even though her teacher
is a religious fundamentalist who does not believe that evolution is true.
In this case the child’s belief is safe despite the teacher not believing that
modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus and therefore not
knowing as much (on the assumption that knowledge entails belief).
Testimony can thus be an epistemically generative process—it may
permit the hearer to gain something the speaker lacks.
So much for testimony from one person to another. But what about
testimony chains? Might a testimony chain that originates with a person
who does not safely believe p prevent the person at the termination of
the chain from knowing p? An extrapolation of the foregoing case proves
9

See Goldman (1986: 52) for a further case demonstrating the importance of
a diachronic approach to epistemic status.
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that safe belief is possible for an agent at the termination of such a chain.
Suppose Billy, one of the children in the biology class, tells his best friend
Jack that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus (and would
not have easily deceived Jack in this case). We take it that Jack also counts
as safely believing that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo
erectus. And so on. And surely the contemporary theist, relying on the
testimony of her parents or community, counts as knowing that God
exists even if that testimony chain originated in a primordial ancestor
who did not know that God exists. With respect to the contemporary
theist, at least, the Argument from Testimony Chains is unsound.10
In light of these considerations, the CSR objector may concede that
whilst (10) is not a universally true principle, there are cases in which it
does hold and that the genesis of theistic belief according to CSR is just
such a case. For example, if I truly believe that the train is about to depart
on the basis of testimony from someone who read a departure schedule
riddled with mistakes, it seems that my belief does not count as safe.
The contemporary theist is in a similar position, so the CSR objector
might argue, if she believes that God exists based on a testimony chain
originating in an ancestor who came to believe that God exists on the
basis of a globally unreliable method.
There is room to argue, however, that exceptionally long testimony
chains with unsafe origins exhibit some unique epistemic features.
We argue that a case can be made for there being a sense in which the
primordial human (S1) is a reliable testifier and as such the contemporary
theist (SN) can safely believe that God exists from a testimony chain
originating with S1 even if S1 used the globally unreliable HADD+ to
arrive at theistic belief. For the sake of argument consider a case in which
S1 holds a set of beliefs {P, Q, R, …} and that many of these beliefs are
generated by HADD+. S1 testifies to others a great many of the beliefs she
holds overall. Let us stipulate further that P is the belief that God exists
and is one of the few true beliefs in the set {P, Q, R, …}. S1 is thus an
unreliable testifier (as the CSR objector contends). Assume further, and
10

We are aware that this is not an uncontentious claim to make as many epistemologists require the speaker to know p, amongst other things, in order for the hearer
to know p, e.g. Burge (1993), Plantinga (1993: 86), and Nozick (1981: 187). But the prima facie plausibility that Billy knows that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo
erectus brings into question the veracity of the traditional view.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND C O GNITIVE SCIENCE

79

not unreasonably, that as time passes humans develop mentally. As they
do, the testimony chains passing along beliefs Q, R, and the other false
beliefs in the set “die out” or “dry up” because people come to realize that
Q, R, etc. are false. We call this feature of long testimony chains epistemic
winnowing; individuals and communities do not generally pass along
information they deem false. And epistemic winnowing is something we
expect others in our community to be committed to.11 By the time SN
receives the testimony that P from a testimony chain originating with S1,
there are no false beliefs from S1’s mouth that are passed along anymore;
if so, from SN’s perspective, at least, S1 is a reliable testifier.
One can explain this conclusion in terms of safety: there is no close
world in which SN falsely believes P or any other relevantly similar belief
by way of a testimony chain originating with S1. It seems reasonable
to us that the contemporary theist who believes by way of such a long
testimony chain is the beneficiary of epistemic winnowing. Therefore,
even if the testimony chain by which a contemporary theist believes
that God exists has an unsafe genesis, the belief held thereby is safe. The
Argument from Testimony Chains is thus unsuccessful.
Additionally, it is doubtful that many contemporary theists believe
that God exists on the basis of an extremely long testimony chain
that originates in an unreliable theistic ancestor. It is more likely that
a considerable number of contemporary theists believe on the basis of
a religious experience. Given that for most of us HADD+ is globally
reliable, it stands to reason that were HADD+ the basis on which theistic
belief is formed as a result of these religious experiences, such theistic
belief would be safe.
IV.
We have presented two different ways in which the cognitive science of
religion might be used to generate an argument towards the conclusion
that the belief that God exists is unsafe. For a number of diverse reasons
each argument fails. This failure does not entail that belief in God is safe,
however. That would require a separate consideration of its own.
11

For the role of one’s community in the epistemology of testimony, see Goldberg
(2010).
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